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C O M P U T E R  S C I E N C E
A trusted node–free eight-user metropolitan quantum 
communication network
Siddarth Koduru Joshi1*, Djeylan Aktas1, Sören Wengerowsky2, Martin Lončarić3,  
Sebastian Philipp Neumann2, Bo Liu2,4, Thomas Scheidl2, Guillermo Currás Lorenzo5, 
Željko Samec3, Laurent Kling1, Alex Qiu1,6, Mohsen Razavi5, Mario Stipčević3,  
John G. Rarity1, Rupert Ursin2
Quantum communication is rapidly gaining popularity due to its high security and technological maturity. However, 
most implementations are limited to just two communicating parties (users). Quantum communication networks 
aim to connect a multitude of users. Here, we present a fully connected quantum communication network on a 
city-wide scale without active switching or trusted nodes. We demonstrate simultaneous and secure connections 
between all 28 pairings of eight users. Our novel network topology is easily scalable to many users, allows traffic 
management features, and minimizes the infrastructure as well as the user hardware needed.
INTRODUCTION
Quantum communication networks present a revolutionary step in 
the field of quantum communication (1, 2). Despite real-world 
demonstrations of quantum key distribution (QKD) (3–8), the dif-
ficulty of scaling the standard two-user QKD protocols to many 
users has prevented the large-scale adoption of quantum communi-
cation. Thus far, quantum networks relied on one or more prob-
lematic features: trusted nodes (9–13) that are a potential security 
risk; active switching (14–17), which restricts both functionality 
and connectivity; and, most recently, wavelength multiplexing (18) 
with limited scalability. The ultimate goal of quantum communica-
tion research is to enable widespread connectivity, much like the 
current internet, with security based on the laws of physics rather 
than computational complexity. To achieve this, a quantum network 
must be scalable, must allow users with dissimilar hardware, must 
be compatible with traffic management techniques, must not limit 
permitted network topologies, and, as far as possible, must avoid 
potential security risks like trusted nodes.
So far, all demonstrated QKD networks fall in three broad cate-
gories. The first category is trusted node networks (9–12) where 
some or all nodes in a network are assumed to be safe from eaves-
dropping. In most practical networks, it is rare to be able to trust 
every connected node. Furthermore, such networks tend to use 
multiple copies of both the sender and receiver hardware at each 
node, thereby increasing the cost prohibitively. The second category 
is actively switched or “access networks” where only certain pairs of 
users are allowed to exchange a key at a time (19). Similarly, 
point-to-multipoint networks are useful in niche applications and 
have been shown using passive beam splitters (BSs) (20–22), active 
switches (14–17), and frequency multiplexing (17, 23–25). The last 
category is fully connected quantum networks, which can be based 
on high-dimensional/multipartite entanglement to share entangle-
ment resources between several users (26, 27). However, the extreme 
complexity of changing the dimensionality of the state produced by 
the source makes this approach unscalable. Fortunately, fully con-
nected networks (i.e., where every user is connected to every other 
user directly) can be achieved using multiplexing and bipartite 
entanglement (18). Nevertheless, the scheme in (18) requires O(n2) 
wavelength channels for n users, which prevents the technology 
from being scaled to more than a few users.
Here, we present a city-wide quantum communication network, 
with eight users, that forms a fully connected graph/network (where 
each user simultaneously exchanges a secure key with every other 
user) while requiring only eight wavelength channel pairs, minimal 
user hardware [i.e., two detectors and a polarization analysis module 
(PAM)], and no trusted nodes. The quadratic improvement in 
resources (the number of channels) used is due to passive multi-
plexing using both wavelength filters and BSs.
Further, to the best of our knowledge, we have demonstrated the 
largest quantum network without trusted nodes to date. Similar to 
(18), just one source of polarization-entangled photon pairs is shared 
passively between all users and requires neither trust in the service 
provider nor adaptations to add or remove users. We performed a 
full QKD experiment on a city-wide scale in deployed fibers with a mix-
ture of superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors (SNSPDs) 
and a single-photon avalanche diode (SPAD). Further, we demon-
strate a new topology with O(n) scaling of all resources consumed 
using only 16 wavelength channels and 2 BS channels to distribute 
eight entangled states, among the 28 links, between eight users in a 
fully connected graph using only one fiber and PAM per user.
RESULTS
By using a combination of standard telecom dense wavelength divi-
sion multiplexers (DWDM) with 100-GHz channel spacing and BS 
multiplexing using in-fiber BSs, we were able to distribute bipartite 
entangled states between all users from just one source of polariza-
tion-entangled photon pairs. The network architecture requires 
only 16 wavelength channels to fully interconnect eight users, as 
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opposed to the 56 channels that would be necessary following our 
earlier scheme (18). The network architecture is best understood 
when divided into different layers of abstraction, as shown in Fig. 1. 
The bottom “physical layer” represents the actual infrastructure 
that supports the network and comprises a central quantum net-
work service provider (QNSP) and the user hardware connected to 
the QNSP via distribution fibers. In the physical layer, the network 
topology requires only one fiber between each user and the service 
provider, while in the logical/connection layer, the topology natu-
rally forms a fully connected graph between all 28 unique pairs 
formed by eight users (see Fig. 1). Every user is equipped with a 
PAM that implements a passive basis choice using two single- 
photon detectors each, as shown in Fig. 2. Users can demultiplex the 
incident photons such that each detector receives fewer wavelength 
channels to improve their signal-to-noise ratio and therefore the 
key rate. We generate secure keys between all 28 links formed by 
pairs of users. Four of these links can be chosen to have premium 
connections with increased key rates, which, when combined with 
active switching, can provide traffic management on the network. 
Last, we demonstrate that our network is capable of supporting a 
mixture of both SNSPD- and SPAD-based user platforms.
The details of the QNSP are shown to the left of Fig. 2. It consists 
of both the source of polarization-entangled photon pairs and the 
multiplexing unit (MU) comprising WDMs and BSs. All multiplex-
ing is performed in a single MU, colocated with the source in our 
implementation. To take advantage of existing fiber infrastructure, 
channels for many users can be sent along fewer fibers, and multiple 
MUs, at various locations closer to clusters of users, can be used to 
create this quantum network. The user hardware—a PAM and two 
single-photon detectors—is shown in Fig. 2B (inset). Photons inci-
dent on a PAM are directed by a BS along either the short path 
where they are measured in the horizontal/vertical (HV) polariza-
tion basis or the long path and through a half–wave plate (HWP) 
such that they are measured in the diagonal/antidiagonal (DA) 
polarization basis. The overall result is that the physical layer con-
stitutes a relatively simple hub and spoke topology, while in the logical 
layer, every pair of users always share an entangled photon pair.
We conceptually divide the eight users of our network referred 
to as Alice (A), Bob (B), Chloe (C), Dave (D), Feng (F), Gopi (G), 
Heidi (H), and Ivan (I) into two subnets of four users (see Fig. 1). A 
subnet uses wavelength multiplexing to form a fully connected 
network among its members—A, B, C, and D. BSs are then used in 
Fig. 1. The overall network architecture showing the physical layer, communication layer, and the way wavelength channels are distributed. The network con-
sists of two layers. (A) The physical layer contains the source of entanglement (blue) and the multiplexing unit (MU; gray). These form the QNSP. Our topology uses just 
one deployed fiber (red) per user to interconnect all eight individual users. (B) The communication layer forms a fully connected graph without trusted nodes for entan-
glement distribution, key exchange, and secure communication (classical communication channels between users are not shown). Each line represents a link—the 
sharing of a bipartite entangled state. Higher-bandwidth links share a second entangled state shown as a red line. (C) Wavelength allocation: Every user of the eight-node 
network receives four wavelength channels denoted by a number (which corresponds to their ITU 100-GHz DWDM grid channel number minus 34). That is, ITU channel 
34 (or 0 in the figure’s naming convention) corresponds to the channel approximately centered at the down-conversion degeneracy wavelength. Thus, a pair of matching 
colors or numbers with equal absolute values and opposite sign denote wavelengths corresponding to an entangled photon pair. The regions shaded in blue and yellow 
are identical subnets and represent the multiplexing using BSs. The last row below the dotted line shows the additional wavelength channel needed to fully interconnect the 
two subnets. Certain user pairs are connected by two entangled photon pairs (such as Alice and Gopi via {8, −8} and {2, −2}) and consequently enjoy an increased key rate.
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each of the wavelength channels to duplicate the first subgroup cre-
ating a second set of four interconnected users—F, G, H, and 
I. Thus, entanglement is shared between every pair of users except 
AF, BG, CH, and DI as the above splitting also gives rise to connec-
tions between the two sets. Two additional wavelength pairs are 
then distributed between these pairs of users to create the fully con-
nected network of eight users with only 16 wavelength channels. 
Each pair of users performs a standard BBM92 (28) protocol where 
the photons shared with all other users are treated as background 
noise. A narrow coincidence window, optimized in postprocessing 
and typically about 130 ps, ensures that this noise only contributes 
minimally to the quantum bit error rate (QBER).
All multiplexing and demultiplexing in the experiment is performed 
with standard telecommunications equipment. The experimental 
setup (shown in Fig. 2) uses a broadband source of polarization- 
entangled photon pairs at telecommunications wavelengths similar 
to that described in (18). Comparable sources have also been reported 
in (19, 23, 25, 29, 30) where a ≈775-nm pump down-converts in a 
type 0 MgO:PPLN (Periodically Poled Lithium Niobate) crystal to 
produce signal and idler photons with a full width at half maximum 
bandwidth of ≈60 nm centered at 1550.217 nm [roughly correspond-
ing to the International Telecommunication Union’s (ITU) 100 GHz 
DWDM grid at channel 34 (Ch34) centered at 1550.12 nm]. Because 
of energy conservation during the down-conversion process, only 
frequencies equidistant from half the pump frequency can support 
entangled pairs. Thus, wavelengths corresponding to the channel 
pairs {Ch33, Ch35}, {Ch32, Ch36}, {Ch31, Ch37}, and so on are en-
tangled with each other. The wide signal and idler spectra were de-
multiplexed into eight wavelength pairs, as above, and each user is 
given a combination of wavelengths according to the table in Fig. 1. 
Thus, each user receives four wavelength- multiplexed channels si-
multaneously via one single-mode fiber, and eight different entan-
gled states are shared between the 28 different pairs of users.
The experiment was performed in two stages. In the first stage, 
the QNSP, the MU, the eight users each connected to the QNSP/MU 
with a single fiber ≈10 m in length, and the 16 detectors were situ-
ated in a single laboratory in the Nano Science and Quantum Infor-
mation building in Bristol. To demonstrate the stability of our network, 
we recorded data for 18.45 hours, as shown in Fig. 3. To be able to 
account for finite key effects with a security parameter of 10−5, we 
computed the private key once every 10 min, and the figure shows 
the average secure key generation rate per second in each 10-min 
period for each of the 28 links (discussed further in Materials and 
Methods). The total secure key obtained is shown in table S1. Users 
A through H used superconducting nanowire detectors from 
Photon Spot, while Ivan used a combination of one SNSPD and one 
InGaAs SPAD. We note that the use of heterogeneous detectors did 
not substantially affect the key generation rates.
Fig. 2. The experimental setup showing the multiplexing and demultiplexing steps along with the user module and distribution of users across the city of Bristol. 
A source of bipartite polarization-entangled photon pairs with a broadband signal and idler spectrum [as shown in the inset in (A)] produces a ∣Φ+〉 Bell state that is 
wavelength and BS multiplexed, as shown. Wavelength multiplexing was performed using 100-GHz International Telecommunication Union’s (ITU) DWDM channels, 
represented as colored numbers plus or minus the central channel 34. BS multiplexing used 50:50 fiber BS. Photons were sent to each user via loop-backs from deployed 
fibers spread across the Bristol city center (blue links in the above map) or several kilometers of fiber coil whose effective coverage is shown by the blue dashed circles on 
the map. The measurement apparatus of each user is shown in the inset in (B). To the left of the dashed green line is the QNSP. Maps were plotted using data from 
mappyplace.com and mapiful.com. (A) The spectrum of the signal and idler photons was calculated from datasheet values and Sellmeier coefficients of (34). Energy 
conservation ensures that pairs of wavelengths, when at the same spectral distance from the central wavelength, are correlated. Such a pair of wavelength channels is 
indicated by the same color number with and without the minus sign. The ITU channel numbers along with their representative colored numbers are shown. (B) The PAM 
of each user consists of a BS to direct input photons along either the short or long optical path. The short path measures the polarization in the HV basis using a polarizing 
beam splitter (PBS) and two SNSPDs. The long path includes an achromatic half–wave plate (HWP) to rotate the measurement basis to DA and measures using the same 
PBS and SNSPDs. a.u., arbitrary units.  o
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In the second stage, the connection between the user and the 
MU was replaced for six users by long-distance links. Furthermore, 
the SPAD was exchanged between Ivan and Gopi. Alice was con-
nected via a 12.6-km spool with a loss of 13.3 dB, Chloe was connected 
to a loop-back from a laboratory in the first floor of the physics 
building of the University of Bristol with a total distance of 463 m 
and 1.36-dB loss, Dave used a 4.3-km spool (15.7 dB), Feng looped 
back from the basement of the Merchant Venturers Building through 
1.625 km of deployed fiber (and a loss of 2.04 dB), Heidi used a 
loop-back connection from the ground floor of Queen’s Building 
with a loss of 1.68 dB and a total distance of 1.624 km, and Ivan was 
connected to another loop-back from the server room of One 
Cathedral Square in the city center totaling 3.10 km (2.57 dB). Bob 
and Gopi continued to be connected via short fibers. Thus, the 
28 links varied in the effective separation of users from 16.6 km to 
≈10 m. This shows the versatility of the network architecture as 
both a local area network and a city-wide metropolitan area network. 
Table S2 shows the secure key rate over these long distances in 
deployed fiber and in fiber spools.
The QBER, and hence the secure key rate, in our proof-of-principle 
experiment was limited by two main experimental imperfections: 
First, a more careful fiber neutralization procedure using the 
manual fiber polarization controllers (FPCs) would signifi-
cantly improve the QBER. Second, the alignment of the HWP 
and the extinction ratio of the polarizing BS (PBS) used in each 
user’s PAM could be further optimized (see the Supplementary 
Materials).
Further optimization of the secure key rate is possible by adjusting 
the pump power in the source, thus changing the pair generation 
rate (see fig. S2). We cannot adjust the pair generation rate in each 
pair of wavelength channels separately. Thus, the optimum pump 
power is strongly affected by the different types/alignment of user 
hardware (like detectors and PAMs) in the network.
Nevertheless, the measured QBER proved to be stable in an 
18.45-hour laboratory test (see fig. S3) and resulted in a stable and 
positive overall secure key rate in a 7-hour metropolitan quantum 
communication network demonstration (see fig. S4).
Using a low-cost design for the PAM at each node, any pair of 
communicating users (say Alice and Bob) obtain three peaks in their 
temporal cross-correlation histogram g(2) between each detector of 
A and B for each correlated pair of wavelengths they share (see Fig. 4 
and fig. S1). Under normal operation in the absence of an eavesdropper, 
the central peak corresponds to all measurements where A and B chose 
the same measurement basis, while the side peaks correspond to A 
and B choosing different measurement bases. Since we do not ex-
plicitly note down the basis choice, we must assume that the BS ensures 
that we measure in both necessary measurement bases. In general, 
it is sufficient to assume that the BS has a bound on its splitting ratio. 
See the Supplementary Materials for more details on the security.
We note that each user only shares the time of a detection event 
and not which detector clicked as required by the protocol. Since 
the two detectors used by a user can have different delays or jitters, 
every user must characterize their setup and modify the time tags 
before they are shared.
Fig. 3. Secure key rate over time for the laboratory experiment. A secure key was generated every 10 min while including finite key effects and a security parameter 
of 10−5. The length of each link is given in table S3, while the average secure key rate for each link is tabulated in table S2 for the metropolitan network and in table S1 for 
the in-laboratory demonstration.
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DISCUSSION
We have successfully realized a complete entanglement-based quan-
tum communication network with improved scaling, traffic manage-
ment, and long-distance links via deployed fiber throughout the 
city. We have shown the effectiveness of a new and improved network 
architecture. Our fully connected scheme can be modified at the soft-
ware or hardware level to create any desired subgraph. Further, by 
multiplexing states intended for several users into a single fiber and 
demultiplexing them later on, our architecture can easily support 
any desired complex network (see the Supplementary Materials).
As the number of users increases, the QNSP can choose to use 
additional wavelength channels, which (up to a limit based on noise 
counts as discussed in the Supplementary Materials) minimally 
affects the key rates of all existing users. This detrimental impact 
can be completely negated by users selectively detecting only the 
desired wavelengths. Alternatively, to increase the number of users, 
the QNSP can use additional BSs, which would reduce key rates but 
drastically increase the number of users on the network with the 
fewest additional wavelength channels. However, this would irre-
coverably affect the key rates of all users. In our network, the physical 
topology grows linearly with each additional user requiring only 
one additional PAM and fiber. Photons intended for multiple users 
can also be multiplexed through the same fiber to optimize cost/
convenience of distribution. We note that the network is also capable 
of producing all possible subgraphs, adding or removing users and 
changing the allocation of premium connections without altering 
the source of entanglement.
Detectors are a significant resource for individual users; there-
fore, we significantly lower the financial cost per user by sending 
several channels onto the same detector at the expense of a slight 
increase in QBER. However, this can be mitigated by demultiplex-
ing the signal on each detector to multiple detectors. The all-passive 
trusted node–free implementation could allow us to use active 
switching to incorporate additional functionality such as traffic and 
bandwidth management, software-defined networking, etc. The 
≈17-km, or more, range of the network, as we have demonstrated, 
is more than enough to create local and metropolitan area networks 
interconnecting end users throughout a city or building. This range 
can be further extended by repeaters, reduced detector jitter, wave-
length demultiplexing to several detectors, and wavelength-selective 
switching to the same detector.
The number of users that can be connected to a given network is 
limited by available resources, loss, and the marginal increase in 
error rate with each simultaneous connection established (with a 
given detector). The error rate is theoretically limited by the proba-
bility that uncorrelated photon detection events can accidentally 
occur in any given coincidence time window. In terms of resource, 
the network scales linearly with respect to user hardware and num-
ber of deployed fibers. On the service provider’s side, the number of 
wavelength channels can be increased drastically by using closer- 
spaced, narrower-band WDMs and by generating broader-band 
down-conversion. For example, periodically poled fibers are a very 
promising method of the latter (30). Using polarization preserving 
methods of multiplexing, such as an on-chip design, would elimi-
nate the need for most FPCs. We were able to demonstrate this by 
connecting several extra kilometers of fiber to many users and 
maximizing the key rate using only the FPCs on each user’s module 
instead of the FPCs of the service provider. Further, simulations 
show that the network topology can be extended to 32 (49) users 
divided into 2 (7) subnets while maintaining a reasonable secure 
key rate (see fig. S5).
The long-term goal of a full-fledged quantum internet requires 
quantum communication networks that support other forms of 
quantum information processing or other quantum technologies. 
The vast majority of such applications rely on the distribution of 
entanglement between several nodes, making the current architecture 
an ideal candidate for further study.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Quantum network service provider
The network consists of the QNSP, distribution fibers, and users. 
The QNSP is composed of a photon pair source set up to prepare 
bipartite polarization-entangled states and a MU.
The source is pumped by diagonally polarized light ∣D〉, from a 
continuous wave (CW) pump laser emitting at 775.1085 nm, which 
passes through a dichroic mirror and a PBS that defines the input 
and output of a Sagnac loop (see Fig. 2) (25, 31, 32). The horizontally 
(vertically) polarized pump light thus propagates counterclockwise 
(clockwise) inside the loop. A HWP after the transmission port of 
the PBS rotates the polarization by 90∘ to vertical. This allows for 
injecting light in both directions of a 5-cm-long magnesium oxide–
doped, periodically poled lithium niobate (MgO:PPLN) bulk crystal 
with a poling period of 19.2 m in which vertically polarized pump 
photons are converted to vertically polarized signal and idler pho-
ton pairs through type 0 spontaneous parametric down-conversion, 
i.e., ∣V 〉 → ∣Vs〉∣Vi〉. The photon pair contribution in the clockwise 
direction is rotated by the HWP and therefore becomes ∣Hs〉∣Hi〉. 
Both contributions are then coherently combined at the PBS and 
are isolated from the pump light by the dichroic mirror. Ideally, 
this will create maximally polarization-entangled states for each set 
of two different wavelengths, 1 and 2, located symmetrically 
about the central wavelength at 1550.217 nm
  ∣ Φ + 〉 =  1 ─  √ 
_
 2(∣  V  λ 1   V  λ 2  〉 + ∣  H  λ 1   H  λ 2  〉) (1)
Fig. 4. Temporal cross-correlation histograms between Gopi and all other 
users. Each pair of users identify photon pairs by their arrival time using g(2) histograms. 
The data shown here were collected over 1 hour for user Gopi (G) during the labo-
ratory demonstration of the network. Users G and A share two sets of correlated 
wavelengths to enable higher key rates; therefore, they share two sets of g(2) peaks 
(GA1 and GA2). Information as to which detector(s) clicked was obscured by all us-
ers. Figure S4 shows the histograms between each pair of detectors for the users G 
and B; however, this more detailed graph contains information about the measure-
ment outcome and cannot be used to generate a key.
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The MU consists of off-the-shelf DWM filters. In addition, the 
MU also has a set of 50:50 fiber BSs. These components were spliced 
together to distribute photon pairs from the source to each of the 
eight distribution fibers, as shown in Figs. 1 and 2.
The spatial mode containing the signal and idler photons from 
the source was coupled into one single-mode fiber and spectrally 
split by a thin-film DWDM from Opneti (with a channel spacing 
and a nominal full width of 100 GHz) into 32 channels, as defined 
by the ITU in G.694.1. Our QNSP consists of one 32-channel 
DWDM (of which only 16 are used) exhibiting insertion losses per 
channel between 0.6 and 2.5 dB [and a polarization-dependent loss 
(PDL) < 2.5 dB according to the datasheet], 16 add/drop DWDMs 
with ≈0.5 dB insertion loss (PDL < 0.1 dB), and eight standard 
fused couplers with insertion loss below 3.4 dB (PDL < 0.1 dB). 
Optical multiplexers form the foundation of DWDM networks 
deployed by the telecommunication industry. There are currently 
two main technologies used in the industry, thin-film filters (TFFs) 
and arrayed waveguide gratings (AWGs). TFFs function by filter-
ing wavelengths serially and are designed to transmit a specific 
wavelength while reflecting all others. They are made of a concate-
nation of interference filters each fabricated with a different set of 
dielectric coating. AWGs are single-stage filters that deploy planar 
waveguide technology consisting of free propagating regions inter-
connected by waveguides. The waveguides have different lengths 
leading to constructive or destructive interferences in the output 
and thus multiplexing/demultiplexing. Because of their low cost 
and robustness against thermal fluctuations, we have chosen TFF 
to build our QSNP. In addition, the main advantage of AWGs over 
TFF is that the parallel multiplexing approach is more conductive 
to high channel-count applications, which is not relevant for quan-
tum signal levels.
We selected 16 wavelength channels symmetrically with respect 
to the degeneracy wavelength of 1550.217 nm, which corresponds 
to ITU channel 34 (see Fig. 2A, inset). On the red side of the spec-
trum, we used ITU’s frequency channels 26 to 33 and channels 35 to 
42 on the blue side. Because of the well-defined pump wavelength of 
the CW laser and energy conservation during down-conversion, we 
obtained polarization entanglement between pairs of channels 
(26 and 42, 27 and 41, 28 and 40, and so on).
Each of the 16 wavelength channels is then split by a BS, such 
that, in total, 32 possible pairs of correlated photons are available. 
Using further add-drop multiplexers before and after the BSs, four 
channels were combined into each single-mode fiber to every user. 
Since the partner photons for each channel can be found in two 
other fibers, each of the users now holds eight polarization-entangled 
connections to other users. This means that each user is connected 
to all the other users, featuring one doubled connection. FPCs were 
used to ensure that the reference frame of polarization in the source 
is (nearly) identical to that of the PAM.
It was not necessary to compensate all channels independently. 
Similar wavelengths were compensated together. At the end, each 
user received four channels (see Figs. 1 and 2) via a single-distribution 
fiber and used a PAM to measure in the HV or DA polarization 
basis.
The distribution fibers were all single mode for 1550 nm but of 
varying lengths and specifications. Several of the fibers were deployed 
across the university and the city of Bristol. We conducted two 
experimental runs, the first with short distribution fibers and the 
second with varying link lengths, as shown in table S3.
Users
Each user in the network is equipped with the PAM and two single- 
photon detectors. The PAM enables passive switching between 
photon polarization measurements in two orthonormal bases (either 
HV or DA). A BS at the PAM’s input randomly directs incoming 
photons either through the short optical path to the PBS and mea-
surement in HV basis or through the long optical path with an ach-
romatic HWP, providing a 45∘ polarization rotation and the same 
PBS for measurement in DA basis. The difference between the long 
and short free-space paths corresponds to 3.7 ns of time delay, 
resulting in polarization analysis in different time bins (29).
We designed the PAM to be completely passive, compact, porta-
ble, simple, and cheap to mass produce and align, but still robust 
and stable. At each PAM’s input and outputs to two detectors, 
SMF28e single-mode fibers are connected to collimators/couplers 
with custom-produced 15.7-mm effective focal length (at 1550 nm) 
SF11 glass singlet lenses (antireflection coated for 1500 to 1600 nm), 
with x-y, tip/tilt, and focus adjustment. Cube BS and PBS are mounted 
on kinematic platforms for rotation and tip/tilt adjustment. The 
achromatic HWP is mounted in a manual precision rotation mount. 
The long optical path was realized using unprotected gold mirrors 
on tip/tilt kinematic mounts.
Commercially available BS, PBS, HWP, and unprotected gold 
mirrors were used (Thorlabs BS012, PBS104, AHWP05M-1600, 
and PFSQ10-03-M03). BS characteristics are T = (56 ± 8)% and R = 
(44 ± 8)%, depending on input polarization and orientation angle. 
The PBSs in use have extinction ratios Tp : Ts > 1000 : 1, Rs : Rp 
roughly between 20:1 to 100:1, transmission efficiency Tp > 90%, 
and reflection efficiency Rs > 99.5%, where T and R represent trans-
mitted and reflected ports, respectively, and the subscripts s and p 
represent the s and p polarized components. Achromatic HWP re-
tardance accuracy is </300. Complete production of lenses and 
optomechanics as well as assembly was done at the Ruđer Bošković 
Institute, in the optical and mechanical workshops of the Division 
of Physical Chemistry.
The PAM outputs are fiber-coupled and launched into two single- 
photon detectors. We used 15 SNSPDs from Photon Spot with 
detection efficiencies ranging from ≈70 to 90%, a jitter of between 
≈60 and 80 ps (including the measurement device), and dark counts 
of ≈1 kHz and one InGaAs avalanche SPAD from ID Quantique, 
model ID230, which has 20% efficiency, ≈100 ps jitter, and dark 
counts of ≈0.05 kHz. After detection, the optical signal is converted 
into an electronic pulse and read out at an 18-channel time-tagging 
module (Swabian instrument model Time Tagger Ultra). Using a laptop, 
we performed an on-the-fly computation of coincidences, basis rec-
onciliation, and secure key rate estimation for all 28 QKD links.
Secure key generation
Because of the design of PAMs and the CW pump of the source, we 
only know whether the measurement basis choice (of a pair of users) 
was matched or not. Here, the information of which detector clicked 
directly encodes the measurement outcome without revealing the 
measurement basis choice. Thus, we cannot know the basis in which 
a detected photon was measured. Suppose the time delay between 
Alice’s Horizontal/Anti-diagonal (HA) detector to Bob’s HA detector 
is longer than the delay between Alice’s Vertical/Diagonal (VD) de-
tector and Bob’s VD detector, then by looking at the g(2) histogram, 
Eve can identify two different delays, which means that Eve can 
guess what the measurement outcome was and thus what the key bit 
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could be. Thus, all users must merge the time tags of all detectors 
into a single data set without which-channel or which-detector 
information.
Then, all users exchange their merged time tags with each other 
via the authenticated public channel(s). After the time tags are shared 
among all users, they calculate a temporal cross-correlation histo-
gram (g(2)) to find the coincidences. Users assign “0” or “1” to the 
measurement outcomes where they both detect a photon within the 
coincidence window and happened to measure in the same basis.
After obtaining the sifted keys, all users perform the error cor-
rection and privacy amplification procedures to extract the final 
secure key. Assuming that each pair of users has been able to iden-
tify and include in their sifted key only those rounds in which they 
happened to measure in the same basis (see security considerations 
in the Supplementary Materials for more details), their final secure 
key length nf can be calculated by
  n f ≥  n s [1 −  H 2 ( e p U ) − f  H 2 ( e b )]  (2)
where ns is the sifted key length, eb is the measured QBER,  e p U is the 
estimated upper bound of phase error rate, H2(x) is the binary 
Shannon entropy, and f is the error correction inefficiency (assumed 
to be 1).
Since we could not divide our sifted key into two individual bases 
(Z and X), here we analyze the phase error rate in the mixed basis 
case. Given failure probability ph, the upper bound of phase error 
rate can be estimated by
  e p U =   e b + (1 +  )  √ 
___________
  
ln 4 − 2ln   ph 
─ n s    (3)
where  ≥ 1, and the phase error probability is  times bit error 
probability. In our experiment, we used passive measurement mod-
ules with 50:50 BSs to perform unbiased measurement basis choices, 
which results in  = 1 (33). Similar arguments can be made to show 
security even in the case of bias in the measurement basis choice. 
From the experimental data, we can infer this bias under the as-
sumption that the fiber coupling for both detectors of the PAM is 
equal. Assume that the basis choice bias of Alice and Bob is  p Z 
A
and  p Z 
B, then the coincidence counts of the left histogram peak be-
tween a pair of users (as seen in the histograms of fig. S1) are related 
to  p Z 
A(1 −  p Z 
B) , the coincidence counts of the middle peak are related 
to  p Z 
A  p Z 
B + (1 −  p Z 
A ) (1 −  p Z 
B) , and the coincidence count of the right 
peak is related to  (1 −  p Z 
A )  p Z 
B. Therefore, when the basis choice is 
biased, one could first measure  p Z 
A and  p Z 
B by monitoring the coinci-
dence counts in the left, middle, and right peaks. Then, one can es-
timate  using these values of  p Z 
A and  p Z 
B. More details on the security 
of this scheme can be found in the Supplementary Materials.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS
Supplementary material for this article is available at http://advances.sciencemag.org/cgi/
content/full/6/36/eaba0959/DC1
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